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Abstract 
This paper analyses a simple model of an economy with imperfect competition in the 
goods markets and heterogeneous individuals due to different skill endowments. We 
then examine how the combination of income inequality, and imperfect competition, 
affect taxing and spending policies. Results indicate that firms’ market power and 
income inequality positively affect the size of fiscal multipliers, meaning that 
spending and taxing multipliers are bigger the more unequal an economy is. We also 
use the balanced budget multiplier to examine how income inequality and imperfect 
competition affect the net increase in output and expenditure caused by fiscal policies. 
The model shows that in highly unequal societies the maximum net increase in output 
and expenditure comes when increased government spending is funded by taxing the 
minority of high-income workers, as the adverse effects on the economy will be 
smaller compared to a tax imposed on the majority. However, this result changes as 
the economy becomes more equal and for high enough percentages of the population 
belonging in the high-income group the maximum net increase in output and 
expenditure comes when the government increases government spending and taxes 
low-income people instead. Finally, we examine the welfare effects of government 
policies. We see that while taxes reduce taxpayers’ welfare, if the net increase in 
output and expenditure is big enough, fiscal policy can be Pareto improving, as both 
income groups benefit from it; or at least the income group not paying taxes benefits 
while the income group paying taxes is not worse off. Income inequality is once again 
crucial in our analysis as it affects the size of welfare losses the taxpaying segments of 
the population have and whether government policies can be Pareto improving. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
    Economic theory has long established that the marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) plays an important part in the economic decisions of individuals (Blanchard 
and Johnson 2012:47). Also recent work by Carroll, Slacalek and Tokuoka (2014) and 
by Carroll, Slacalek, Tokuoka and White (2016) has confirmed the theoretical 
assumption that there exists a inverse relationship between income and an individual’s 
MPC with wealthier individuals using a smaller percentage of their income for 
consumption and vice versa. These works have also shown that there exists 
considerable variation in the MPC between different income groups in an economy 
and the reason for this variation is the distribution of income between the different 
income groups, or in other words income inequality. 
    An important implication of these findings is that income shocks have a different 
effect on individuals and that income inequality affects economic policy; however, 
most economic models do not incorporate income inequality or even the MPC in their 
analysis. Simple new Keynesian models such as Mankiw (1987), Molana and Moutos 
(1992) and Torregrosa (1999) and even more complex DSGE models like Bouakez 
and Rebei (2007), Ercolani (2007) and Forni, Gerali and Pisani (2010) either operate 
under the assumption of the representative agent or, even if they have heterogeneous 
agents, do not use the MPC in their analysis. For that reason, we will try to create a 
simple model with income inequality, which results in different MPCs. More 
specifically we use a simple general equilibrium model of an economy with imperfect 
competition as in Mankiw (1987), Molana and Moutos (1992); but we expand it by 
adding heterogeneity, in the form of increased skill endowment, and this 
heterogeneity along with the different MPCs results in income inequality between 
individuals. We then examine how income inequality and imperfect competition can 
influence fiscal policy. 
    Our results indicate that the magnitude of fiscal multipliers is influenced by 
imperfect competition and income inequality in the economy. In the case of 
government spending, our findings show that the multiplier of government spending 
is bigger the greater imperfect competition and the more unequal the economy is. 
Examining the impact of taxation, we see that inequality and imperfect competition 
influence the magnitude of the multiplier in the same way they affect government 
spending. Additionally when using the balanced budget multiplier we find that 
income inequality and imperfect competition also have an effect on the net economic 
impact of fiscal policy. Using the balanced budget multiplier, we see that in unequal 
societies, where the majority of the population has low incomes, increasing 
government spending and then taxing the minority of high-income workers achieves 
the maximum net increase in output and expenditure. However, as the percentage of 
high-income workers increases, fiscal multipliers become smaller and so does the 
impact of spending and taxation. Consequently, for sufficient percentages of high-
income workers the maximum net increase in output and expenditure comes when the 
government increases spending and finances it by taxing the minority of low-income 
workers. Finally, we examine the welfare effects of government policies. The findings 
show us that government spending financed by taxation can benefit both income 
groups; or at least benefit the income group that does not pay any taxes while 
eliminating the welfare losses of the income group that pays taxes, leading to a Pareto 
improvement. Income inequality plays an important part once again because it 
positively affects the welfare losses of taxation. These results suggest that fiscal 
policy which takes into account income inequality between individuals and uses the 
right mix of spending and taxation can help stabilize the economy and promote 
growth while minimizing any welfare losses.  
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide the model of 
our economy. Section 3 has an analysis of public spending schemes financed by 
lump-sum, labor and profit taxes respectively. Section 4 analyses the welfare effects 
of government policies and how income inequality affects them. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The economy 
 
 
    The model we will use is based on a simple new Keynesian model of imperfect 
competition like the ones of Mankiw (1987), and Molana and Moutos (1992). We 
construct the simplest economic model possible in order to illustrate the main idea we 
want to present in this paper. Since our main objective is to examine how income 
inequality affects fiscal policy, we will refrain from using more complex general 
equilibrium models, which could alter but not invalidate our argument. 
 
 
2.1 Individuals 
 
 
    We assume that the economy is populated by a continuum of individuals indexed 
by )1;0( . A percentage λ of those individuals belong to Type 1 and have no skill 
endowment, while the remaining )1(   percentage are Type 2 individuals, who have 
high skill endowment due to education or work experience. 
    The time available to all individuals equals T. This time is divided between 
working hours,  and leisure, L . However, as we mentioned Type 2 individuals are 
skilled workers; for this reason their labor productivity is bigger. Therefore the 
effective labor supply of a Type 2 individual is )( i  where 0i  shows the 
increased productivity of a Type 2 worker. The labor supply of a Type 1 individual 
equals  . Wages are equal to the amount of labor supplied by each individual so 
Type 1 workers have a wage equal to  and Type 2 workers have a wage equal to 
)( i .    
    People choose between two goods, consumption and leisure. As we have seen in 
Carroll, Slacalek and Tokuoka (2014) and in Carroll, Slacalek, Tokuoka and White 
(2016) individuals with higher incomes use a smaller percentage of their income for 
consumption compared to those who have smaller incomes; in other words their MPC 
is smaller. For this reason, we assume that Type 1 people choose more consumption 
and less leisure compared to Type 2 individuals.  
    Each individual maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function where he chooses 
between consumption ( iC ) and leisure ( iL ) based on the information we analyzed in 
the previous paragraphs: 
 
11111 log)1(log LaCaU  ,    11 a      (1) 
22222 log)1(log LaCaU  ,    12 a      (2) 
     
    Based on our assumptions about the differences between individuals and the 
aforementioned literature, we assume that 21    which shows that Type 1 
individuals use a greater percentage of their income for consumption, compared to 
Type 2 individuals who have bigger incomes but consume a smaller percentage of 
their income. 
    Individuals are also the owners of the economy’s firms and receive profits   while 
they pay all taxes. We first assume that people pay a lump-sum tax, iV  but we will 
later change that assumption. Each individual’s budget constraint is therefore: 
 
ii VLTPCi  )(  , 
 
ii VTLPCi    (3) 
 
    As we mentioned before, 1  and 2 , denote the share of income which is used for 
consumption. Using these indexes, we find the consumption function of every type of 
individual. 
 
)( 111 VTPC     (4) 
 
])[( 222 VTPC i     (5) 
 
    Equations (4) and (5) are the consumption functions for each one of the two types 
of people in the economy and 21 ,  denote their MPCs. Note that in equation (5) the 
consumption of Type 2 individuals is higher by i . That is because these individuals 
can consume more due to their higher skills and higher incomes. However, this effect 
is mitigated by their lower MPC.     
 
 
2.2 Firms 
 
 
    We have a number of M firms in the economy, and each firm produces quantity q 
of a single good using labor as their only input. The demand function for the whole 
industry equals: 
 
P
Y
Q    (6) 
 
where Q is total output of the industry P the price level and Y is the economy’s 
expenditure. 
    The cost function of each firm is: 
 
cqFqTC )(   (7) 
    We assume, as in Mankiw(1987) and Molana and Moutos(1992) that firms operate 
in an environment of imperfect competition and have market power. We calculate 
market power by using the Lerner Index (Lerner 1934: 157-175) 
 
P
MCP     (8), 
 
where μ is the Lerner index, MC the marginal cost and P the price level. 
    Combining equations (6) and (8) and by differentiating equation (7) we get the 
following equation describing the demand function of the industry: 
 
Y
c
Q
)1(    (9) 
 
    We then calculate total profits for the whole industry which equal revenue minus 
the costs: 
 
cQMFPQ   (10) 
 
Using equation (9) and assuming for simplicity that fixed costs are equal to zero we 
express profits in terms of expenditure and the profit mark-up that firms have: 
 
Y  (11) 
 
Equation (11) shows that profits in the economy depend on expenditure 
 
 
2.3 Government 
 
 
    Government raises revenue from taxation in order to produce and provide a single 
public good to the economy. The level of taxes raised is equal to 21 VV   and it is used 
to buy goods produced by the firms, which are then used as input to produce the 
public good. This public good can be some form of social service (e.g. education, 
healthcare) or purely economic in nature (e.g. production of energy, fuel, 
manufacturing goods and infrastructure by government owned enterprises). The 
government budget constraint requires that spending equals revenue: 
 
GVV  21   (12) 
 
)(qfG    (13) 
 
 
2.4 Total expenditure and output 
 
 
    Total output in the economy is equal to the sum of expenditure of the private 
sectors i.e. Type 1 and Type 2 individuals and government expenditure: 
 
GPCY i   (14) 
 
Using equations (4) and (5) and the population percentages to substitute in equation 
(14) we find: 
 
GVTaVTaY i  ])[()1()( 2211    (15) 
 
Using equation (11) and rearranging terms we find an expression that also makes use 
of the Lerner index: 
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    Equation (16) shows that in our model output is affected by taxation (Vi), 
government spending (G) and the Lerner index (  ), just like in other New-Keynesian 
models of imperfect competition. Private consumption also plays a role through the 
different MPCs ( ia ) which are, as we noted before, a result of income differences. 
However when we allow for the existence of heterogeneous agents, we see that 
consumption and in turn output is not affected by the MPC alone, but rather by 
income inequality, which is the product of income distribution and the MPC ( 1  and 
2)1(  ). Different labor supplies, and subsequently different wages (T and iT  ), 
also play an important role since the bigger the difference, the bigger income 
inequality will be.   
 
 
3. Fiscal policy using different tax financing sources 
 
 
    In this section, we examine the impact of income inequality and imperfect 
competition on fiscal policy. Specifically we examine how imperfect competition and 
income inequality affect the size of fiscal multipliers. In addition, using the balanced 
budget multiplier seen in Mankiw (1987) we examine the effect of imperfect 
competition and income inequality on the net increase on output and expenditure, i.e. 
the net economic effect of fiscal policies. For the time being we ignore any changes 
these policies can cause in the welfare of any income group and focus only on the 
effect that government spending and taxation have on output and expenditure. We 
will deal with this issue in section 4, where we examine the welfare losses that these 
policies can cause and the possibility of a Pareto improvement. 
 
 
3.1 Government spending financed by lump-sum taxes 
 
 
    First, consider an increase in government spending, financed by increasing lump-
sum taxes: 
 ])1([1
1
21 aadG
dY
     (17) 
 
    This result is similar to the government spending multiplier seen in most textbooks. 
As expected increases in government spending raise expenditure and output in the 
economy. However, what is important is that the increase in output and expenditure 
caused by government spending becomes greater the more market power firms have. 
This happens because increases in government spending help raise profits which in 
turn raise expenditure and output in the economy even further in the way that the 
textbook Keynesian public spending multiplier and the multiplier seen in Mankiw 
(1987) work. In the limiting case where μ=0 this process ends after the initial increase 
in government spending and the multiplier is unity. Therefore imperfect competition 
is crucial in our analysis because as firms’ market power increases, 
dG
dY
 approaches 
the standard government spending multiplier of Keynesian models which is greater 
than unity.  
    The important finding in this model however is that income inequality has a 
positive effect in the size of the government spending multiplier. Just like in ordinary 
Keynesian models, the MPC has a positive effect on the size of the multiplier but in 
the case of heterogeneous agents it is the product of the MPC and the percentages of 
people belonging to each income group – in other words income inequality – that 
affect fiscal multipliers. According to equation (17) the bigger income inequality is, 
the bigger the fiscal multiplier of government spending becomes; this means that 
increases in government spending lead to a greater increase in output and expenditure 
the bigger income inequality in an economy is. This happens because as income 
inequality increases, the percentage   of people belonging to the Type 1 category 
which has lower incomes but a bigger MPC of 1  increases as well; at the same time 
the percentage  1  of Type 2 people who have higher incomes but a smaller MPC 
of 2  decreases with income inequality. As a result the more unequal an economy, 
the bigger ))1(( 21   becomes, which in turn means that the denominator 
becomes smaller and that the overall result of equation (17) becomes bigger.  
    Therefore in highly unequal economies where   21 1   , the overall 
consumption of Type 1 people is much bigger compared to the consumption of Type 
2 people who have the smaller MPC of 2 , because they individually consume much 
more than Type 2 people do and also because they constitute a much larger segment 
of the population. Consequently, the overall effect in output and expenditure from 
increased public spending in an unequal economy will be much bigger when 
compared to a more equal economy. This is why in highly unequal economies where 
the majority of the population belongs to the low-skill, low-income group increases in 
government spending have a bigger positive effect on output and expenditure. 
    After increasing government spending, the government chooses which population 
group to tax in order to have a balanced budget: 
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    As we can see in equations (18) and (19) the size of the fiscal multiplier of taxes is 
positively affected by the size of market power, and by income inequality, just like in 
the case of public spending in equation (17). Just like in the case of government 
spending, when   21 1    - in other words in a highly unequal economy - total 
consumption of Type 1 individuals is much bigger compared to the consumption of 
Type 2 people, because they individually consume much more than Type 2 people do 
(since 21   ) and also because they constitute a much larger segment of the 
population. Therefore, the negative effect of a tax increase in output and expenditure 
will be bigger in economies that are more unequal. 
    As the percentage of high-skilled workers in the economy increases, the effects of 
fiscal policy change. Government spending multipliers become smaller the more 
equal the economy becomes because ))1(( 21    is now smaller since more 
people now belong to the )1(  percentage of people who have higher incomes and 
as result a smaller MPC of 2 ; this means that they use less of their extra income for 
consumption. Moreover, since high-income workers are now a bigger part of the 
population, the negative effect that taxing these individuals has on the economy 
becomes bigger. However taxing high-income workers remains the best policy. 
Eventually, for sufficiently high percentages of high-income workers, i.e. 
when 12)1(   , taxing the minority of low-income individuals will have a 
smaller negative effect in output and expenditure than taxing high-income workers. 
    In order to examine the net economic impact of fiscal policy we use the balanced 
budget multiplier seen in Mankiw (1987), which gives us the net increase in output 
and expenditure caused by increased government spending financed by taxes. To use 
this multiplier we simply subtract equations (18) and (19) from equation (17): 
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    Equations (20) and (21) show us the net increase in expenditure and output caused 
by increased government spending when Type 1 or Type 2 people are taxed 
respectively i.e. the balanced budget multiplier. Comparing equations (20) and (21) 
helps us find which income group should be taxed when government spending 
increases in order to achieve the maximum net increase in output and expenditure. 
This comparison also reveals the effect of income inequality on the net effects of 
fiscal policy. 
    As we can see when comparing the balanced budget multipliers, the crucial term in 
the analysis is income inequality. In a highly unequal economy, 
where 12)1(   , the maximum net increase in expenditure and output comes 
when the government increases government spending and taxes the minority of high 
skilled, high-income workers as the adverse effects on expenditure and output will be 
smaller. The logic behind this idea is one analyzed before: In an economy where the 
majority of the population belongs to the low-income group taxing these people has a 
greater adverse effect on the economy due to that group’s greater MPC and because 
they represent such a big part of the population. Hence, high-income individuals 
should be taxed because they have smaller MPCs and constitute a smaller part of the 
population. As the percentage of high-income workers increases and they become the 
majority, the negative effect of taxing these people increases. Eventually when the 
number of Type 2 workers becomes big enough that 12)1(   , the maximum 
net increase in output and expenditure comes when the government increases 
government spending and balances the budget by taxing low-skilled, low-income 
workers as the adverse effects on expenditure and output will be smaller since they 
now are the minority.  
 
 
3.2 Government spending financed by labor taxes 
 
 
    We now examine the case where a labor tax is used in order to finance the 
government budget. To study this case we make a few changes in equations (3), (4), 
(5) and (12). More specifically, we no longer have a lump-sum tax, but rather a tax on 
labor income equal to Lit . The new budget constraints for each income group and for 
the government are given by:  
   )1( 111  TtPC L   (22) 
   ])(1[ 222  iL TtPC    (23) 
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    Equation (15) which represents the total output function is modified accordingly, 
when the government uses taxes on labor. Rearranging terms yields an expression 
similar to (16):  
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    Again, we examine the effect of government spending financed by taxing the two 
different population groups: 
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    Equation (26) is the same as equation (17) so we do not need to analyze this result 
again. However, looking at equations (27) and (28) we see the major difference 
between labor taxes and lump-sum taxes. As we can see, the magnitude of the tax 
multiplier is affected by income inequality and by the firms’ market power the same 
way as before. However, in the case of labor taxation we see that labor supply itself 
can also affect output and expenditure in two ways: The first one is through the 
decrease in income caused by taxes. When a tax is imposed on labor then for every 
hour worked, the individual worker receives a lower return on his labor; this results in 
reduced expenditure and output in the economy. The product of our measure of 
income inequality and the left hand side term in the parentheses ( 1a  and 
)()1( 2 iTa   in equations (27) and (28) respectively), captures this effect for each 
income group.  
    The second way labor taxes reduce output and expenditure is through the labor – 
leisure tradeoff that takes place when taxes on labor increase. When labor taxation is 
imposed, workers decide to either increase work hours in order to achieve a certain 
income level (income effect) or to decrease their labor supply and increase their 
leisure instead (substitution effect). If the second effect is stronger this may cause a 
loss in  their welfare, as well as in output and expenditure in the whole of the 
economy, above and beyond the loss caused by the revenues that the government 
collects by increasing taxes; in other words deadweight loss. The terms 1Le  and 2Le  
are the labor elasticities of Type 1 and Type 2 people respectively; when multiplied 
with the term outside the parentheses –income inequality– they give us the 
deadweight loss for each income group. Assuming that 1Le  and 2Le  are positive as in 
Rosen and Gayer (2013) workers will reduce their labor supply when labor taxes 
increase, meaning that the substitution effect dominates, which further reduces output 
and expenditure in the economy. In the limiting case where 1Le  and 2Le  are equal to 
zero and labor supply is perfectly inelastic the deadweight loss is equal zero as well.  
    Since high-income workers have a higher labor supply of )( iT  > T  the negative 
effect that taxing these individuals has on output and expenditure will be bigger, 
compared to a tax levied on low-income individuals. The size of labor supply 
elasticity is also important, for example if 1Le  < 2Le  in other words if the labor supply 
of high-income workers is more elastic, taxing these workers causes a bigger 
reduction of output and expenditure due to bigger deadweight losses. However, the 
percentage )1(  of people belonging in the high-income group and their MPC of 
12    can mitigate the negative effects of taxing high-income workers. Intuitively, 
even though high-income workers have bigger incomes they individually consume 
smaller percentages of their income compared to low-income workers; and in 
economies with high inequality, they constitute a smaller part of the population so 
their overall consumption will be smaller than that of low-income workers.  
    In order to find the net increase in output and expenditure we follow the same 
method used in the case of lump sum taxation: 
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    The balanced budget multiplier show us that in the case of labor taxes skill 
endowments and labor supply elasticities also affect the maximum net increase in 
output and expenditure caused by increased government spending. More specifically, 
the bigger the endowment differences between individuals are, the bigger the skill 
gap, wage gap and the adverse effect of taxing high-skilled workers will be. Still, 
income inequality plays a part in determining the choice of taxation the government 
should make, but this choice should now take into consideration the differences in 
labor supply and elasticities, and the associated deadweight losses. In unequal 
societies where   21 1   , the crucial relationship the government examines 
remains almost the same as it was in lump-sum taxes, namely  11 1 LeTa  >  22 1)()1( Li eTa   . As in lump-sum taxes income inequality 
affects the maximum net increase in output and expenditure caused by an increase in 
government spending; but now, due to the skill endowment differences and different 
elasticities, the negative impact of taxing high-income individuals is bigger even in a 
highly unequal economy. Consequently it now takes a smaller percentage of people 
belonging to the high-income group in order for the policy that brings the maximum 
net increase in output and expenditure, to change (i.e.  11 1 LeTa  <  22 1)()1( Li eTa   ); and the bigger the skill endowment i  and 
labor supply elasticity of high-income workers 2Le  are, the smaller this percentage 
needs to be.  
 
 
3.3. Government spending financed by profit taxes 
 
 
    Finally, we examine the case of taxes imposed on firm profits. This tax is a non-
neutral profit tax similar to the one in Kreutzer and Lee (1988) and Lee (1998). 
Therefore, we assume a tax on profits equal to cit  which is similar in its effect to an 
ad-valorem or a per unit tax. Same as before, we modify equations (3), (4), (5) and 
(12), and get the budget constraints for each income group and for the government: 
   )1( 111  ctTPC    (31) 
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    Using equations (15) and the ones above gives us the total output function when 
profit taxation is used: 
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    We then differentiate equation (38) with respect to G, tc1 and tc2 just as we did in 
the previous cases and find: 
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    Equation (35) shows that the size of the government spending multiplier is once 
again positively affected by imperfect competition and income inequality. However 
this time the taxation of firm profits also has an effect on the multiplier meaning that 
the bigger taxes on firm profits are, the smaller the government spending multiplier 
becomes. The reason this happens is that if taxes are imposed on profits this reduces 
the incomes individuals receive from the firms they own, which in turn lowers their 
expenditure. This negative effect reduces the overall expenditure and output in the 
economy through the channel of the Keynesian multiplier. 
    Examining equations (36) and (37) we see that income inequality, the firms’ market 
power, and profit taxes affect the size of tax multipliers much like the public spending 
multiplier in equation (35). What is interesting to note however is that unlike the two 
previous cases, now taxes on firms owned by one income group influence public 
spending and consumption of both income groups. This is seen in equations (36) and 
(37) where the terms of market power, income inequality and the labor supply enter 
the numerator of the fractions of taxation of both income groups. The intuition behind 
this outcome is simple and based on Rosen and Gayer (2013): When a profit tax is 
imposed, the production of firms is reduced, the price paid by consumers increases 
while the price that the firm itself receives decreases. In addition, because both the 
price and the quantity produced are now smaller, that means that the profits of the 
firms taxed have been reduced. Individuals who have seen their profits reduced will 
buy fewer goods both from their own firms and from the ones owned by other people. 
Additionally firms may reduce their workers’ wages because of the decrease in profits 
and production. This eventually leads to a reduction of expenditure and output in the 
whole of the economy through the channel of the Keynesian multiplier. This result is 
shown by the product of the terms [ )()1( 21 iTaTa   ] with the term outside 
the parentheses ( 1  and  2)1(   respectively).  
    When it comes to the reduction of government expenditure, the explanation above 
can be used. The government uses goods produced by the firms as inputs. Since 
production of firms has reduced and the prices have increased, production of public 
goods also decreases.  
    In order to find the net increase in output and expenditure we follow the same 
method used in the case of lump sum and labor taxation: 
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    Equations (38) and (39) show us that the net increase in output and expenditure is 
affected by the same factors as in the case of labor taxes, namely labor supply and it’s 
elasticity and by income inequality. Imperfect competition also has a negative effect 
on the size of the net increase of output and expenditure and in the limiting case 
where μ=0 the increase in taxation does not cause any decrease in output and 
expenditure.  
    The size of income inequality, this time alongside the firms’ market power, is still 
important in achieving the maximum net increase in output and expenditure. Looking 
at an unequal society where   21 1   , the crucial relationship the government 
needs to examine remains similar to the ones in the previous cases: 
 221121 )1]()()1([])()1([  GTaTaGTaTa ii . This 
result shows that, just as in the previous cases, in highly unequal societies the 
maximum net increase in expenditure and output comes when the government 
increases government spending and balances the budget by taxing the profits of Type 
2 workers. This happens because when   21 1     the total consumption of 
Type 1 individuals is much bigger compared to the consumption of Type 2 people, 
because they individually consume much more than Type 2 people do and also 
because they are a much larger part of the population. Eventually 
when 12)1(   , the maximum increase in net expenditure and output comes 
when the government increases government spending and balances the budget by 
taxing the profits of low-skilled, low-income workers as the adverse effects on 
expenditure and output will be smaller because they now are the minority. 
 
 
4. Welfare analysis  
 
 
    The previous section has shown that income inequality plays a role in the increase 
of output and expenditure in the economy by affecting the size of fiscal multipliers. 
But the net economic impact is not the only measure of the effectiveness of economic 
policy; we also need to see if a government’s fiscal policy can actually be Pareto 
improving for the people living in the economy. For this reason, we will examine the 
welfare effects that government policies have, using a methodology similar to Adam 
(2004) in order to measure welfare gains or losses from government policies.  
 
 
 
4.1 Lump sum taxation 
 
 
    If we want to make a complete evaluation of the welfare effects of government 
policy, we need to examine both the benefits of increased government spending and 
the losses of taxation. Government spending is assumed not to affect utility directly; 
therefore, our analysis is somewhat limited in scope. Utility increases only if the 
budget constraint of the individual increases. However, since individuals receive all 
the profits and wages in the economy the change in output and expenditure when 
government spending increases is sufficient for examining the effect of government 
spending as in Mankiw (1987). Therefore, we will use the balanced budget multiplier 
to examine the effect of government spending on utility. In order to calculate the 
welfare losses caused by taxation we will use a methodology similar to Adam (2004). 
We first derive the indirect utility functions for Type 1 and Type 2 workers using 
equations (1) (2) (4) and (5): 
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    Using these results, we calculate the general welfare function following Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006)  
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    We then calculate the loss in welfare (in absolute value) from imposing a lump-sum 
tax in each income group as: 
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    Equations (43) and (44) give us the welfare losses for an individual belonging to 
each of the two income groups  
 
What is important for the evaluation of fiscal policy is to see whether government 
policies can be Pareto improving. Following Adam (2004), we will examine if the 
expected gains of government policies are bigger than the costs necessary to finance 
them. To examine that we compare the net economic effect of each spending-taxing 
plan has, with the welfare loss of each income group. First, we multiply equation (21) 
with   and equation (22) )1(   in order to find the net economic benefits that each 
income group that pays taxes has, and then we compare the results. The government’s 
policy mix can lead to a Pareto improvement only if the share of the net increase in 
output and expenditure caused by the increase of spending that each income group 
receives is bigger than its welfare losses caused by the taxes it pays to finance this 
increase i.e. :  
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    Equation (45) show us if government spending financed by taxing low-income 
people can be Pareto improving, while equation (46) show us if government spending 
financed by taxes on high-income people can be Pareto improving. We see that if the 
left hand side of (45) and (46) is bigger than or equal to zero then fiscal policy can be 
Pareto improving. The logic behind this result is simple: If the relationships above are 
true then the net increase of expenditure and output caused by increased government 
spending increases the welfare of both income groups; or at the very least keeps the 
welfare of the group that pays taxes steady while benefiting the group that does not 
pay taxes1. However, if the left hand side of (45) and (46) is negative, then although 
the increased output and expenditure benefits the group that does not pay taxes the 
welfare losses of the income group that pays taxes are so big that the increase in 
output and expenditure cannot compensate them.  
    In both equations, we see that imperfect competition increases welfare. We then 
examine the effect that our income inequality variable has on welfare by analyzing the 
effect of its two components. An increase in inequality means an increase in . A 
higher value of   increases the welfare gains brought about by the net increase in 
output and expenditure caused by (a balanced budget) increase in government 
spending; but at the same time it also increases the welfare losses that government 
policies have on the low-income group’s welfare. At the same time, increases in 
inequality reduce both the welfare gains as well as the welfare losses that the high-
income group has due to government policies. Equations (45) and (46) also reveal the 
effect that the different MPCs have on the welfare losses caused by government 
policies. The bigger the MPC on the second term of the equation, the bigger welfare 
losses become. However this effect is somewhat lessened because the MPC is also the 
exponent of the price level and as the exponent increases the denominator of the 
fraction increases as well, which in turn means a smaller right hand side in (45) and 
(46).  
 
 
4.2 Labor taxation and profit taxation 
 
 
    After examining the case of lump-sum taxes, we examine the cases of labor income 
and profit taxation using the same method as in section 4.1. Beginning with labor 
taxes, we use equations (1), (2), (22) and (23) to derive the indirect utility functions of 
                                               
1 Increased government spending  benefits both income groups or at least benefits the one that does not 
pay taxes while the welfare of the other group remains the same 
because:
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each income group; then we multiply these functions with the percentages of people 
belonging to each income group and compare them with equation (29) and (30): 
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    Just as in the previous section we calculate the general welfare function. 
Differentiating with respect to 1Lt  and 2Lt  gives us the change in welfare caused by 
labor taxes: 
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    After multiplying (29) and (30) with  and )1(  respectively, we compare them 
with equations (49) and (50) 
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    The result is almost identical to the case of lump-sum taxes, the only difference 
being now that the elasticity of labor supply positively affects the welfare loss that 
taxation has. The reason this happens is due to the double effect of taxes we analyzed 
in section 3. When taxes on labor increase workers will find their income has been 
reduced. The product of the terms outside the parentheses and the first term inside the 
parentheses on the right hand side of equations (51) and (52) gives the change in 
welfare due to the reduction of income by taxes. However, as we have seen in the 
previous section workers might then choose to substitute labor for leisure (substitution 
effect) which leads them to reduce their labor supply and consequently face even 
bigger welfare losses. The product of the terms outside the parentheses with the 
elasticity of labor supply on the right hand side of equations (51) and (52) gives us the 
effect that the labor-leisure trade-off has on welfare.  
    We then examine the case of profit taxation, by following the same process as the 
one above. We first use equations (1), (2), (31) and (32) to find the indirect utility 
functions: 
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    Differentiating with respect to profit taxes gives us the welfare losses of each 
income group in the case of profit taxes: 
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    Using the same process as in the previous cases, we have: 
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    The results are identical to (51) and (52) the only difference being that the elasticity 
of profits now takes the place of elasticity of labor supply. The product of the terms 
outside the parentheses with the first term inside on the right hand side of equations 
(57) and (58) show us the direct effect that profit taxes have on the welfare of firm 
owners by reducing their profits and income. The product of the terms outside the 
parentheses with the elasticity of profit taxes captures the welfare losses caused by the 
deadweight losses of profit taxes that we examined section 3.   
    In the three different cases that we examined we find that income inequality, 
represented by the MPC and the percentages of people belonging to low-income and 
high-income groups, has a positive effect on the welfare losses of the income group, 
which pays the taxes needed to finance government policies. Consequently, income 
inequality plays an important role in the choices that government should make, 
regarding its overall fiscal policy. As we have seen in sections 3 and 4 income 
inequality affects not just the maximum net increase in output and expenditure when 
public spending increases and is financed by taxation – in other words the net fiscal 
effect of government policies- but also the welfare effects that these policies can have 
and whether or not they can be Pareto improving. These results have important policy 
implications. It shows that government policies, which take into account income 
inequality in the economy, can not only promote economic growth by increasing the 
impact of expansionary policy on economic activities, but also improve welfare 
throughout the economy by using policies resulting in a Pareto improvement for both 
income groups.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 
    The purpose of this paper was to try to examine the effect of income inequality and 
imperfect competition on an economy’s fiscal policy. For this reason, we used a 
simple model of general equilibrium with imperfect competition in the goods market 
and heterogeneous agents who have different skill endowments and as a result 
different wages. Using this simple model, we then tried to explore how the spending 
and taxing policy is affected. Results indicate that income inequality and the market 
power of firms can positively affect the size of fiscal multipliers in an economy 
meaning that government spending and taxing multipliers are bigger in economies 
that are more unequal. Additionally using the balanced budget multiplier, we see that 
income inequality and imperfect competition also affect the net economic effect of 
government policies. More specifically in more unequal societies, where the majority 
of the population has low incomes, the maximum net increase in output and 
expenditure comes when the government increases government spending and then 
taxes the minority of high-income workers. However, as the percentage of high-
income workers increases, fiscal multipliers become smaller and the impact of 
spending and taxation changes. Consequently, for sufficiently high percentages of 
high-income workers the maximum net increase in output and expenditure comes 
when the government increases spending and taxes the minority of low-income 
workers. Finally, we examine the welfare effects of government policies. Results 
show us that increased government spending financed by taxation can benefit both 
income groups; or at least benefit the income group that does not pay any taxes while 
eliminating the welfare losses of the income group that pays taxes, leading to a Pareto 
improvement. Income inequality plays an important part once again because it 
positively affects the welfare losses of taxation. These results suggest that fiscal 
policy which takes into account the income inequality between individuals and uses 
the right mix of spending and taxation can help stabilize the economy and promote 
growth while minimizing the welfare losses of fiscal policy and lead to Pareto 
improvements. 
    The model could be extended in several different directions. One way of doing it 
would be by taking into account the way that public spending can affect individual 
consumption and welfare. Additionally using a labor market with imperfect 
competition between high skilled and low skilled workers might make this analysis 
more realistic.  
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